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APARTHEID BALTIMORE STYLE: THE RESIDENTIAL
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GARRETT POWER**
On May 15, 1911, Baltimore Mayor J. Barry Mahool, who was
known as an earnest advocate of good government, women's sufferage,
and social justice, signed into law "lain ordinance for preserving peace,
preventing conflict and ill feeling between the white and colored races
in Baltimore city, and promoting the general welfare of the city by pro-
viding, so far as practicable, for the use of separate blocks by white and
colored people for residences, churches and schools."' Baltimore's seg-
regation law was the first such law to be aimed at blacks in the United
States, but it was not the last. Various southern cities in Georgia, South
Carolina, Virginia, North Carolina, and Kentucky enacted similar
laws.2
The legal significance of housing segregation laws in the United
States was shortlived. In 1917 the United States Supreme Court struck
down the Louisville, Kentucky ordinance' and thereby constitutionally
eviscerated the ordinances of other cities as well. But the historical sig-
nificance of Baltimore's segregation ordinances remains.
History remembers the Mahool administration for having placed
Baltimore in the forefront of municipal reform. The story of how the
Mahool government earnestly proposed and enacted an apartheid stat-
ute as a progressive social reform has a contemporary message: It cau-
tions us to discount the righteous rhetoric of reform; it reminds us of
the racist propensities of democratic rule; and it sets the stage for un-
derstanding the development of a covert conspiracy to enforce housing
segregation, the vestiges of which persist in Baltimore yet today.
Throughout the early nineteenth century Baltimore housing was
not racially segregated, and even following the Civil War, blacks lived
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in all of Baltimore's twenty wards. Although the majority of blacks
resided in the city's central, southern, and eastern sections, there was no
Negro quarter or ghetto. Blacks were scattered throughout the north-
ern reaches of the town, clustering together in narrow, two-story alley
houses and working nearby in domestic service while more affluent
whites lived on the main thoroughfares.
Urbanization was to modify this fluid mixture. In 1860 only 4.2%
of all Negroes in the United States were city dwellers; by 1890 it had
risen to almost 20%,' as blacks joined whites in a rush to the cities.
Between 1880 and 1900 Baltimore's black population increased 47%
from 54,000 to 79,000. During this same period, the city's white popu-
lation was increasing by 54%. Hence, while the black population was
increasing by 25,000 people, the proportion of blacks in the population
was on a slight decline.6
Negro newcomers with little money and limited job opportunities
sought out the cheapest housing in town. They rented shanties and
doubled up in small houses, resulting in Baltimore's first sizeable
slums. The first slum to reach maturity was "Pigtown" in Southwest
Baltimore. A contemporaneous account from 1892 describes it as
follows:
Open drains, great lots filled with high weeds, ashes and garbage
accumulated in the alleyways, cellars filled with filthy black water,
houses that are total strangers to the touch of whitewash or scrub-
bing brush, human bodies that have been strangers for months to
soap and water, villainous looking negroes who loiter and sleep
around the street corners and never work; vile and vicious women,
with but a smock to cover their black nakedness, lounging in the
doorways or squatting upon the steps, hurling foul epithets at
every passerby; foul streets, foul people, in foul tenements filled
with foul air; that's "Pigtown." 7
As neighbors who could afford to do so moved away from this
squalor, Pigtown ripened into a ghetto.' Whites were not the only resi-
dents to take flight. In this time of relative permissiveness in race rela-
tions, blacks also were free to buy houses elsewhere in the city.
4. Hawkins, A Year of Segregation in Baltimore, 3 CRISIS 17, 17 (1911). Cf. W. Paul,
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Ph.D. dissertation, University of Wisconsin).
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[VOL. 42
RESIDENTIAL SEGREGATION ORDINANCES
Baltimore's black bourgeoisie, then perhaps 250 in number, sought to
remove themselves from the "disreputable and vicious neighborhoods
of their own race." 9 Thus a first wave of blacks relocated in the north-
western part of the city as those blacks that could afford to do so
purchased second-hand housing around St. Mary's Orchard and Biddle
Streets, in what was to become the 17th Ward. (A street map of the
11 th, 14th, and 17th Wards as they existed in 1904 appears at the end of
this article.) Their neighborhood began in the alleys and then moved
out to the wider streets, displacing Bohemians and Germans.
The Negro migration to Northwest Baltimore accelerated as
whites abandoned their homes there and fled to newly opened subur-
ban tracts. For example, when the B & 0 Railroad displaced 100 black
families to expand its yards,'0 they sought alternative housing in the
northwest's 17th Ward. The second wave of black arrivals was poorer
and doubled up to pay the rent; slum conditions similar to those in
some of the city's southwestern sections began to develop." By 1903
the Negro population was perhaps the majority in the 17th Ward;' 2 the
slum that had developed in the Biddle Alley neighborhood in the lower
portions of the ward had replaced Pigtown as the worst in the city. 13
Blacks were not the only slum dwellers. In the 1880's Russian
Jews and Poles were immigrating to Baltimore in large numbers.
These immigrants faced the same problems as Negroes - little money
and few jobs. As a result, their housing conditions were similar to
those in the black slums: the houses were overcrowded, poorly venti-
lated, and lacked water and sewerage. The major difference between
these immigrant ghettos and the black ghettos was in the type of hous-
ing they contained: Immigrants converted once-substantial three- and
four-story row houses into tenements for up to ten families. The black
alley districts consisted of smaller ill-built structures. Another differ-
ence was that the immigrant ghettos tended to locate on the east side of
town. Thus the growing immigrant population exacerbated black
housing conditions by displacing Negroes from that area."
These slums were but a symptom of the social chaos in turn-of-
9. Haynes, supra note 5 at Ill (discussing consequences of segregation in cities
generally).
10. Hawkins, supra note 4, at 27; transcript of interview with Dr. J.O. Spencer, Record
Group [R.G.] 102, Box 121, National Archives (June 20, 1916).
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GROES 32, R.G. 102, Boxes 120-21, National Archives (1923) (Bureau Publication 119, part
of a study of infant mortality in Baltimore) [hereinafter cited as CHILDREN'S BUREAU
STUDY].
12. A Social Problem, supra note 6, at 497.
13. W. Paul, supra note 4, at 392.
14. Hawkins, supra note 4, at 27.
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the-century Baltimore. Between 1870 and 1900, the city's population
grew from 250,000 to 500,000, as ex-Confederates, Negroes, and Euro-
pean refugees crowded into the city. The year 1890 was the beginning
of a severe slump in the economy. Families could not afford even the
cheapest housing so they doubled and tripled up. Unemployment was
rampant; women and children worked for minuscule wages under hor-
rendous conditions in an effort to make ends meet. Services proved
inadequate or nonexistent - police, fire protection, water supply, and
schools were deficient and the city had not yet constructed a sanitary
sewer system. 15 Urbanization, industrialization, and depression had
concentrated in Baltimore a growing population of the poor, the sick,
and the ignorant.
The crisis in Baltimore and other cities produced a movement for
social reform. Social reformers joined the already established Progres-
sive Movement in opposing political machines such as the Rasin-
Gorman Ring in Baltimore, and in advocating civil service reform, the
merit system, streamlined government, home rule, and corrupt-prac-
tices legislation. 6 But the social reformers who came from the univer-
sities and churches had greater ambitions. They advocated initiatives
designed to remedy the fundamental ills of society - illiteracy, pes-
tilence, crime, and poverty.'1
The first leader of the organized Social Reform Movement in Bal-
timore was Daniel Coit Gilman, President of the Johns Hopkins Uni-
versity. In 1881, he founded the Charity Organization Society and
modeled it after similar groups in London, Buffalo, Boston, and New
York. It provided the poor with gifts of food, clothing, and coal, along
with "friendly visitors" who volunteered to help on a one-to-one ba-
sis. 18 In addition, Jane Addams's pioneer settlement house in Chicago
was soon copied by Baltimore clergyman Edward H. Lawrence. '9 Fur-
ther, Baltimore philanthropists Robert Garrett and Henry Walters cop-
ied projects undertaken elsewhere in sponsoring playgrounds and
public baths.2"
Social reformers found support for their efforts among Baltimore's
medical community. Recent discoveries in bacteriology led prominent
15. J. CROOKS, supra note 7, at 155-56.
16. See generally J. CROOKS, supra note 7; R. HOFSTADTER, THE AGE OF REFORM:
FROM BRYAN TO F.D.R. (1955); Crane, The Origins of Progressivism, in THE PROGRESSIVE
ERA 11-34 (L. Gould ed. 1974).
17. S. HUBER, EFFICIENCY AND UPLIFT: SCIENTIFIC MANAGEMENT AND THE PROGRES-
SIVE ERA 1890-1920 77 (1964).
18. J. CROOKS, supra note 7, at 158-59.
19. Id. at 162.
20. Id. at 180-83.
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physicians to identify the need for public health programs. For exam-
ple, in the 1890's Dr. William Osler, physician-in-chief at the Johns
Hopkins Hospital, called public attention to the social implications of
typhoid and tuberculosis and supported efforts to establish a pure water
system. His colleague, Dr. William Henry Welch, in a speech in 1892,
estimated that better sanitation in American cities could save 100,000
lives each year.2 ' In 1897, Dr. John S. Fulton, along with Osler and
Welch, founded the Maryland Public Health Association.22 It dis-
cussed proposals for construction of a sanitary sewer system (Baltimore
then had none) and for establishment of a city hospital for infectious
diseases.23 The proposal for a hospital, however, was poorly received.
The City Council resisted creation of a "pest house," because it would
reduce property values and spread disease to the surrounding
neighborhood.
In 1902, on the other hand, the state government began a city-wide
campaign against tuberculosis. Tuberculosis was then the most wide-
spread and fatal of the infectious diseases: it killed 1,000 Baltimoreans
each year.24 This campaign stressed the relationship between over-
crowded housing, lack of open space, tainted food, and a high inci-
dence of TB. It lobbied for laws requiring registration of persons
infected with TB, prohibiting spitting, and providing for construction
of hospitals.25
Not surprisingly, these first efforts at social reform proved unequal
to the task. Self-help, friendly visiting, volunteerism, and timid gov-
ernment initiatives failed to abolish poverty, to prevent crime, and to
cure tuberculosis and other infectious diseases. Among the reformers'
greatest shortcomings was their failure to do more for blacks. The half-
dozen privately financed settlement houses reached at most several
hundred Baltimoreans; Negroes never saw a settlement. As initially
established, public baths and playgrounds designed to humanize the
urban environment were for whites only. These facilities were not
available to blacks until 1905 and 1908, and then only to a limited ex-
tent.26 Fledgling public health efforts had made no discernable impact
on the black communities - the Negro death rate from both smallpox
and tuberculosis was twice that of the white average.27
21. Id. at 164-65.
22. Id. at 171-72.
23. Id. at 182-83.
24. Id. at 184.
25. Id. at 187.
26. Id. at 181, 183.
27. Id. at 188; S. Olson, supra note 8, at 236.
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Notwithstanding their failures, social reformers remained un-
daunted. Unable to treat or to cure the fundamental ills from which
the urbanizing, industrializing society suffered - illiteracy, morbidity,
crime, and poverty - their response was to focus on a symptom rather
than the disease. Slum housing came to the forefront of the reformers'
concerns; environmentalism came to be an article of faith.28 In Balti-
more of 1903, progressive Mayor Thomas Hayes expressed this faith as
follows:
debasing environments like these are the ones from which creep
forth the pinched bodies and pinched souls which make our
criminals and disturbing elements. These wretched abodes are
menacing to both health and morals. They are the breeding spots
from which issue the discontents and heartburnings that some-
times spread like a contagion through certain ranks of our labor-
ing element.29
Because city slums were to blame for vice, crime, pauperism, and anar-
chy, improved housing conditions would cure society's ills.
Not long after Mayor Hayes's remark, Gilman's Charity Organi-
zation Society commissioned an investigation entitled Housing Condi-
tions in Baltimore.3 This study was aimed at the alleys that housed
Baltimore's blacks and at the sections occupied by rapidly increasing
foreign populations, on the assumption that "conditions existed in
those neighborhoods that could not but be detrimental to the welfare of
their residents."'" Its preliminary concerns were that: houses covered
so much of the lot-space as to diminish the supply of light and air; large
numbers of families were crowding into dwellings originally designed
for single-family occupancy; many rooms were gloomy and ill-venti-
lated; alley houses were damp and dilapidated; and sanitation was de-
fective. The Society intended the investigation "to secure accurate and
reliable information" and thereby to take "the first step towards the
removal of these evils."32
The investigation selected four districts for detailed field study.
Two districts were described as "tenement districts" and included a
large number of houses occupied by three or more families. One tene-
ment district was occupied largely by Russian Jews, and the other was
occupied almost exclusively by Poles. Two districts were described as
28. See generally Moore, Directions of Thought in Progressive America, in THE PROGRES-
SIVE ERA 35-55 (L. Gould ed. 1974).
29. S. OLSON, supra note 8, at 270.
30. J. KEMP, HOUSING CONDITIONS IN BALTIMORE (1907).
31. Id. at 12.
32. Id.
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"alley districts" because they illustrated conditions prevailing in inte-
rior alleys and minor streets. These districts were occupied largely by
Negroes along with a few native white families and Germans. In real-
ity, the housing stock in the tenement and alley districts was not mutu-
ally exclusive - tenement districts included houses on interior streets,
and alley districts included some tenements.
One of the districts studied, Biddle Alley, was the same neighbor-
hood to which middle-class blacks had escaped in the 1880's. By 1903
it had fallen on hard times. The area investigated by the Society was
bounded by Biddle and Preston Streets and Druid Hill and Penn-
sylvania Avenues. Two hundred and fifteen overcrowded houses, con-
taining 270 apartments (seventeen percent of which were one room),
were crammed into the alleys and minor streets within the block. Typi-
cally, the houses were two or three stories high and two rooms deep
with a basement kitchen and living room. The most common problem
was the "dirty, dark, damp and dilapidated" basements.33 The investi-
gation did not determine the number of residents in Biddle Alley; the
Society felt that tabulating the information concerning the number of
people living in alley houses was a "waste of time" because of the un-
trustworthiness of the tenants.34
The Biddle Alley neighborhood was literally and figuratively at
the bottom of what was becoming the black section of Baltimore. In
1903 the section with a majority Negro population was described as
"bounded on the south by Biddle Street, on the west by Argyle Avenue,
on the east by Druid Hill Avenue, and on the north by North Avenue.
This region extends about a quarter of a mile from east to west and a
mile north and south."35 It consisted of the 17th Ward to the south and
a portion of the 14th Ward to the north.
The Negro district was highly stratified, both economically and so-
cially. The lower portion of the district, found in the 17th Ward, which
embraced the Biddle Alley neighborhood, was a filthy slum. Animal
excrement and garbage lay in the streets. Privy faults and cesspools
overflowed into the alleys and oozed into the basement, kitchen, and
living areas.36 Cholera and typhoid were a constant threat, and the
district was the tuberculosis center for the city: According to one
health department official, "there is not a house on Biddle Alley, in
which there has not been at least one case of tuberculosis. 37 Biddle
33. Id. at 45.
34. Id. at 43.
35. A Social Problem, supra note 6, at 498.
36. W. Paul, supra note 4, at 393-94.
37. J. KEMP, supra note 30, at 19.
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Alley was the "lung block." The value of property in the 17th Ward
was in a precipitous decline.3"
The upper portion of the district, found in the 14th Ward, con-
tained the houses of the Negro community's business and professional
people. A quiet residential neighborhood, properties sold for higher
prices than in equivalent white neighborhoods. Middle-class white res-
idents still lived in the area. The best black dwellings bounded along
upper Druid Hill Avenue. 39
The Housing Conditions in Baltimore report, interrupted by the
Baltimore Fire of 1904, was finished in 1907, under the direction of
Janet E. Kemp. Its statistics and photographs vividly display the hor-
rors of the slums and the plight of the slum-dwellers, but it was less
compelling when suggesting solutions. The report's text observed:
"Nothing but enlightened public sentiment crystallized into legislative
requirements can ever guarantee sanitary surroundings to the small
wage earner who cannot afford to pay a high rent. "40
The report suggested legislative requirements that differed for ten-
ements and alley houses. The report proposed an inexpensive "mar-
ket" solution for tenement districts. It sought to force landlords to
improve existing tenements, and to require builders to construct model
tenements, by proposing regulations setting height limits, requirements
of separate toilets for each apartment, and annual inspections. The
proposal was plausible. In the early twentieth century, tenements were
profitable ventures. Commerical developers were building new flats for
the "dollar-a-day" man.41 Together, housing codes and building re-
strictions might eliminate all substandard tenements by forcing entre-
preneurs to pay the cost of improving them. The solution also was
consistent with the classic concept of the state's police power. The re-
port proposed regulations protecting health, safety, and morals which
businessmen might not transgress in the pursuit of profit, but otherwise
did not interfere with the economic order.
The report's recommendations for alley districts differed. It pro-
posed to reduce the density in existing alley houses, to condemn those
that were uninhabitable, to ban sleeping in basements, and to prohibit
erection of additional alley houses.42 Although these measures would
improve the quality of housing, they necessarily would reduce the
38. S. OLSON, supra note 8, at 276.
39. W. Paul, supra note 4, at 391-92.
40. J. KEMP, supra note 30, at 93.
41. R. LUBOVE, THE PROGRESSIVES AND THE SLUMS: TENEMENT HOUSE REFORM IN
NEW YORK CITY 1890-1917 182 (1962).
42. J. KEMP, supra note 30, at 87-92.
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quantity. Thus the report's recommendations would work a particular
hardship on blacks, who lived in the alleys, for whom no new houses
were being built, and who encountered resistance when attempting to
move into white neighborhoods. In effect, the report relegated the
growing Negro population to a shrinking number of houses.
The report also distinguished between the inhabitants of tene-
ments and alley-houses. Negroes were singled out for criticism: "This
is not a study of social conditions, but it is impossible to observe these
gregarious, light-hearted, shiftless, irresponsible alley dwellers without
wondering to what extent their failings are a result of their surround-
ings, and to what extent the inhabitants, in turn, react for evil upon
their environment."43 The "low standards and absence of ideals"
among Negroes was "held to some degree accountable for the squalor
and wretchedness" which characterized the alley neighborhoods.44
Despite the plausibility of its proposals and the prestige of its
sponsors, the city took no action on the Housing Conditions in Balti-
more report. In the northwest the Negro district continued to grow
both in population and size. By 1910, 12,738 blacks had crowded into
the 17th Ward,45 constituting over fifteen percent of the city's overall
Negro population and sixty-one percent of the ward's overall popula-
tion.46 The few remaining whites were rapidly leaving. It was the
worst slum in the city.4 7
Not surprisingly, those in the black community who could afford
to do so also sought to move away from the squalor and disease. Mid-
dle-class blacks began to look covetously at quiet residential houses to
the west and north. Between 1903 and 1910, the western boundary of
the Negro district moved six or seven blocks from Argyle Avenue to
Gilmore Street in the 15th and 16th Wards.48 To the north, the black
population in the 14th Ward continued to grow. By 1910, 8,392 Ne-
groes resided there, the second highest number. Negroes were distrib-
uted fairly evenly over the remainder of the city, excepting five wards
where their numbers were negligible.49
Expansion of the Negro district to the west and north was not
without incident. White residents struggled against the "black sea" for
years.50 For example, a protest convinced the School Board to reverse
43. Id. at 16.
44. Id. at 18.
45. CHILDREN'S BUREAU STUDY, supra note 11, at 5.
46. W. Paul, supra note 4, at 391.
47. Id. at 392; see also supra text accompanying note 13.
48. A Social Problem, supra note 6, at 497; Hawkins, supra note 4, at 27.
49. CHILDREN'S BUREAU STUDY, supra note Ii, at 5.
50..4 Social Problem, supra note 6, at 498.
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a decision converting a white school to a black one."' Windows were
broken and black tar was smeared on white marble steps.5 2 And when
a black family moved into a house on Stricker Street they were at-
tacked and the house was stoned.53 But white terrorism was no match
for the combined purchasing power of housing-hungry blacks. Money
talked.
In their effort to move eastward, on the other hand, blacks had
been unsuccessful. Druid Hill Avenue had remained the eastern
boundary of the Negro district. In its 1600 block, residences of the
"best" Negro families were directly across the street from Western
High School, the "best" public girl's school - which was for whites
only. 4 This barrier was reinforced by the affluence of the white neigh-
borhood to the east. Eutaw Place was a broad, landscaped boulevard
which had been designed to encourage residential development and to
enhance property values in the vicinity. The plan was a success and the
Eutaw Place neighborhood had become one of the most fashionable
residential sections of Baltimore.55 It had spread three blocks west of
the boulevard itself with Druid Hill Avenue serving as its western
boundary.
In the summer of 1910, George W.F. McMechen purchased a
house at 1834 McCulloh Street. McMechen, a Yale law graduate and a
practicing attorney, moved with his wife and children from his former
house on Prestman Street, ten blocks to the west. McMechen was cele-
brating his professional success by moving into one of the most fash-
ionable neighborhoods in Baltimore. 6 The move is memorable only
because McMechen and his family were black. He had crossed the
eastern boundary of the Negro district and purchased a house in the
Eutaw Place neighborhood.
This violation of the color line provoked considerable agitation.
Police were necessary to protect the McMechen house from young ruf-
fians.57 A mass meeting was held on July 5, 1910 and a petition pre-
pared requesting that the Mayor and City Council: "take some
measures to restrain the colored people from locating in a white com-
munity, and proscribe a limit beyond which it shall be unlawful for
51. Id.
52. Hawkins, supra note 4, at 27.
53. Transcript of interview with Dr. J.O. Spencer, R.G. 102, Box 121, National Archives
(June 20, 1916).
54. S. OLSON, supra note 8, at 277.
55. J. DORSEY & J. DILTS, A GUIDE TO BALTIMORE ARCHITECTURE 187 (2d ed. 1981).
56. George W.F. McMechen, Md. Vertical File, Enoch Pratt Free Library; Hawkins,
supra note 4, at 28.
57. Hawkins, supra note 4, at 28.
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them to go . . . ."I The petitioners were concerned that Negroes in-
tended to "plant themselves on Madison Street and Eutaw Place" as
well.59
Milton Dashiell was George W.F. McMechen's brother at the
Maryland Bar. Dashiell had been born in Dorchester County, Mary-
land in 1859; he attended St. John's College in Annapolis, read law,
and was admitted to practice in 1882. For a time, he practiced in Ken-
tucky before he returned to his home state.6" According to all reports,
his career was undistinguished; he was a "briefless lawyer. "61
Dashiell resided on the southern fringe of the 11 th Ward at 1110
McCulloh Street. The neighborhood was all white, but it was located
just a block away from the Biddle Alley district, the infamous "lung
block." The "Negro invasion" of Eutaw Place inspired Dashiell to
draft a law designed to prevent blacks from further encroaching on
white neighborhoods. The bill was introduced into the City Council by
Councilman Samuel L. West.6 2
The bill took a long and tedious course. Public hearings were held
at which the primary spokesmen against the ordinance were Negroes.
Both branches of the City Council finally passed the ordinance, by a
strict party vote - all Democrats voted in favor and all Republicans
voted against.63
The Baltimore Sun summarized the ordinance's provisions as
follows:
That no negro can move into a block in which more than half of
the residents are white.
That no white person can move into a block in which more than
half of the residents are colored.
That a violator of the law is punishable by a fine of not more than
$100 or imprisonment of from 30 days to 1 year, or both.
That existing conditions shall not be disturbed. No white person
will be compelled to move away from his house because the block
in which he lives has more negroes than whites, and no negro can
be forced to move from his house if his block has more whites than
negroes.
That no section of the city is exempted from the conditions of the
58. Petition to the Mayor and City Council, Baltimore City Archives, Mahool Files, File
406 (July 5, 1910).
59. Id.
60. Baltimore Sun, December 18, 1910, at 7, col. 6.
61. Hawkins, supra note 4, at 28.
62. Baltimore Sun, December 20, 1910, at 7, col. 7.
63. Id.
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ordinance. It applies to every house."
In addition, the ordinance prohibited negroes from using residences on
white blocks as a place of public assembly and vice versa.65
On December 17, 1910, City Solicitor Edgar Allan Poe issued an
opinion declaring the ordinance constitutional. He opined that the or-
dinance was within the state's police power "because of irrefutable
facts, well-known conditions, inherent personal characteristics and in-
eradicable traits of character perculiar [sic] to the races, close associa-
tion on a footing of absolute equality is utterly impossible between
them, wherever negroes exist in large numbers in a white community,
and invariably leads to irritation, friction, disorder and strife."66 He
determined that this ordinance was permissible under the fourteenth
amendment to the U.S. Constitution because "a State has the right
under its police power to require the separation of the two races wher-
ever the failure to so separate then [sic] injuriously affects the good
order and welfare of the community."67
Mayor J. Barry Mahool signed the ordinance into law on Decem-
ber 20, 1910. The occasion was a ceremonial one. Two pens were used
in the signing - one was given to Dashiell and one to Councilman
West. The pen was a "favor" which Dashiell announced he would
"treasure . . .from every point of view."68 West got into the spirit of
the occasion by announcing that he would have a copy of the ordinance
framed and hung in his home.69
It is easy to understand racist Dashiell's pride of authorship, but
from today's perspective, Mayor Mahool's support is enigmatic. This
experiment in apartheid is at best a sell-out to Baltimore plutocracy,
and at worst an invidious denial of housing to Baltimore's blacks. Yet
Mahool, who is remembered as a champion of social justice, 70 eagerly
signed the ordinance without apology.
At first it seems anomalous that a member in good standing of the
Progressive Movement - which advocated the elimination of slums as
the breeding ground for crime, disease, and poverty - would enthusi-
astically support a law designed to worsen Negro housing conditions.
But in a broader historic context it makes sense. Progressive reformers
64. Id. at cols. 5-6.
65. Baltimore, Md., Ordinance 610 (Dec. 19, 1910).
66. Memo from Edgar Allan Poe to Mayor J. Barry Mahool, Baltimore City Archives,
Mahool Files, File 451 (Dec. 17, 1910).
67. Id.
68. Letter from Milton Dashiell to Mayor J. Barry Mahool, Baltimore City Archives,
Mahool Files, File 406 (Nov. 26, 1910).
69. Baltimore Sun, December 20, 1910, at 7, col. 7.
70. J. CROOKS, supra note 7, at 102.
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like Mahool found themselves faced with social chaos. Their efforts
had failed to cure the fundamental ills - illiteracy, morbidity, crime,
and poverty - from which the urbanizing, industrializing society suf-
fered. Thus defeated, they resolved to treat two of the most bother-
some and visible symptoms of society's ailments: riots and epidemic
disease.7'
Because the riots were often racial in nature, and because the
black slums were viewed as the source of contagion, the reformers fo-
cused on the black neighborhoods. The ultimate goals of the Progres-
sives, however, were not directed to improving the living conditions of
black slum families. Progressive reformers were not concerned with
the plight of Negroes; as C. Van Woodward observed: "The blind spot
in the . . . progressive record . . . was the Negro ... ."" "Victim
blaming" was much less costly than attempting to solve the underlying
social problems.7
3
Social Darwinism provided the ideological basis for this view, and
some reformers used it to posit a basic inferiority of black people.'
For example, the campaign rhetoric of the Disenfranchisement Move-
ment (a nationwide effort to deny Negroes of their right to vote) de-
picted blacks as slovenly and corrupt brutes.7 5 Turn-of-the-century
census data supported the view that Negroes were a dying race: blacks
showed a higher mortality rate and a lower birth rate than whites. 76
Viewed in this context, Mahool's support for the first segregation
ordinance is less surprising. Similarly, the Baltimore Sun, which by
1911 had good credentials as a reform newspaper, editorially apolo-
gized for the segregation ordinance as follows: "Baltimore has to deal
with the condition as it exists and not with the abstract theories of theo-
rists and those who are not personally concerned."'"
Many Progressives thus agreed that poor blacks should be quaran-
tined in isolated slums in order to reduce the incidents of civil distur-
bance, to prevent the spread of communicable disease into the nearby
white neighborhoods, and to protect property values among the white
majority. Historian George M. Frederickson tied these strands
together:
71. R. LUBOVE, supra note 41, at I1-12.
72. C. VANN WOODWARD, THE STRANGE CAREER OF JIM CROW 91 (3d rev. ed. 1974).
73. J. LEVIN & W. LEVIN, THE FUNCTIONS OF DISCRIMINATION AND PREJUDICE 41-42
(2d ed. 1982).
74. Schmidt, Principle and Prejudice: The Supreme Court and Race in the Progressive
Era. Part ." The Heyday of Jim Crow 82 COLUM. L. REV. 444, 453-54 (1982).
75. M. CALLCOTT, THE NEGRO IN MARYLAND POLITICS 1870-1912 101-38 (1969).
76. Schmidt, supra note 74, at 453.
77. Baltimore Sun, April 7, 1911, at 6, col. 3.
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If blacks were a degenerating race with no future, the problem
ceased to be one of how to prepare them for citizenship or even
how to make them more productive and useful members of the
community. The new prognosis pointed rather to the need to seg-
regate or quarantine a race liable to be a source of contamination
and social danger to the white community, as it sank even deeper
into the slough of disease, vice and criminality.7"
The first segregation ordinance proved to be politically and legally
deficient. It was a foregone conclusion that the ordinance would be
vehemently opposed by the Negro community. But blacks were not
alone in opposing the ordinance: they were joined in opposition by
real estate brokers and white owners of property located in mixed
neighborhoods. Objections arose before the ordinance was signed. For
example, on December 10, 1910, a broker wrote Mayor Mahool expres-
sing concern that the ordinance would preclude rental to Negroes in a
block in which Negroes already lived but were in the minority. The
writer said:
the property owners of this city who will lose thousands of dollars
through the too strict terms of this ordinance, rely upon you to
carefully raise such facts as are here presented before signing this
ordinance, a serious effect of which will probably not be fully real-
ized until some of us come face-to-face with some of our property
vacant and in a mixed neighborhood.79
On December 12, 1910, a property owner less gramatically, but more
poignantly, made the same point:
I am also a property owner and I have a house i [sic] south Balti-
more where one of the owners have rented the next two houses
from mine to colored. My tenants are white. They tell me in
spring they will move, now that this ordinance becomes a law and
if white people don't move in my house I will have to pay expenses
on property that does not pay my [sic] in return. I approve in
keeping colored people to themselves and this ordinance as it is
will work a hardship on property owners all over the city. I would
approve of a law where there is no colored people in the block."
Hence, the ordinance was politically flawed in that it worked at cross
purposes to the economic well-being of a significant white constituency.
78. G. FREDERICKSON, THE BLACK IMAGE IN THE WHITE MIND: THE DEBATE ON
AFRO-AMERICAN CHARACTER AND DESTINY 1817-1914 255 (1971).
79. Letter to 1. Barry Mahool, Baltimore City Archives, Mahool Files, File 451 (Dec. 10,
1910).
80. Letter from Charles S. Otto to J. Barry Mahool, Baltimore City Archives, Mahool
Files, File 406 (Jan. 16, 1911).
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In addition to its political flaws, literal application of the ordi-
nance produced some unlikely incidents. One story is told of a white
person who temporarily vacated his house while it was under repair,
thereby making the block fifty-one percent black. Return to his own
home would have made him a criminal.8 In the same vein, Daniel W.
Shaw, a black Methodist preacher, wrote Mayor Mahool and asked the
following question:
In reference to the operation of the . . . ordinance, I beg to ask:
when colored Methodist preachers living in parsonages owned by
their churches, located in blocks where the majority of the resi-
dences are white, are ordered by their bishops to move, and a new
colored preacher is sent to take the charge, will the . . . ordinance
prohibit the new colored preacher from moving into the house
owned by his church located in the white block.82
Mayor Mahool referred the question to Milton Dashiell, who righ-
teously replied:
I am only able to say that the colored parson, considered to repre-
sent the most enlightened of the negro race, should have estab-
lished his home in the midst of his race, and that he should have
encouraged others of his race to do likewise . . . .The inquiry
seems to me like a hypothetical one, and can be answered by the
parson, unaided, save by the ordinance itself.8 3
A legal challenge to the ordinance was not long in coming. In less
than a month, twenty-six criminal cases were sent to court. In the first
one to go to trial, Judges Harland and Duffy of the Supreme Bench of
Baltimore, without going into the merits of the legislation, declared the
ordinance ineffective and void because it was "inaccurately drawn."84
There is no published report of their opinion, but presumably the inac-
curacy was in the ordinance's title. Section 221 of the City Charter of
Baltimore provided: "Every ordinance enacted by the City shall em-
brace but one subject which shall be described in its title .... ,85 The
title of the first segregation ordinance was nondescriptive; it grandly
declared that the provision was "[an ordinance for preserving order,
securing property values and promoting the great interests and insuring
8 1. Hawkins, supra note 4, at 29.
82. Letter from Daniel W. Shaw to J. Barry Mahool, Baltimore City Archives, Mahool
Files, File 406 (Jan. 16, 1911).
83. Letter from Milton Dashiell to Daniel W. Shaw, Baltimore City Archives, Mahool
Files, File 406 (Jan. 17, 1911).
84. Hawkins, supra note 4, at 29.
85. BALTIMORE CITY CHARTER § 221 (1898) (emphasis added).
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the good government of Baltimore City,"86 without mentioning racial
segregation of housing.
Partisans of the segregation ordinance were undaunted. Indeed,
they viewed the court's decision as an encouragement "to push further
their war into Africa."87 Councilman West decided to drop lawyer Da-
shiell, however, and to seek the assistance of more eminent counsel. He
turned to William L. Marbury, whose credentials as a segregationist
were well established by his role in the Disenfranchisement
Movement.88
The second segregation ordinance corrected the legal flaws of the
first. Further, in a major substantive change, Marbury drafted the or-
dinance to be inapplicable to "mixed" blocks. All black blocks were to
remain all black, all white blocks were to remain all white, and inte-
grated blocks were left to pursue their market destiny. Marbury
designed this change to quiet opposition from white landowners and
real estate professionals. He also changed the ordinance's style, replac-
ing Dashiell's reasonably straightforward prose with redundant
legalese. For example, the most important sentence in the second ordi-
nance read as follows:
[I]t shall be unlawful for any colored person to move into or use as
a residence or place of abode any house, building or structure, sit-
uated or located on any block. . . the houses, buildings and struc-
tures on which block, so far as the same are occupied or used as
residences or places of abode, in whole or in part, shall be occu-
pied or used as residences or places of abode by white persons
89
Not everyone was pleased with the second segregation ordinance.
A delegation of black property owners urged its veto, 90 and some bro-
kers reiterated their concern that the ordinance would depress real es-
tate values in mixed neighborhoods. Milton Dashiell wrote to Mayor
Mahool from his sick room both to reaffirm his authorship of "the plan
of segregation" and to object to some features of the Marbury version
which were too liberal in permitting mixed occupancy. 9' These objec-
tions notwithstanding, Mahool signed the ordinance on April 7, 1911.92
86. Baltimore, Md., Ordinance 610 (Dec. 19, 1910).
87. Hawkins, supra note 4, at 29.
88. Id. at 30.
89. Baltimore, Md., Ordinance 654, § 2 (April 7, 1911).
90. Baltimore Sun, April 8, 1911, at 9, col. 5.
91. Letter from Milton Dashiell to J. Barry Mahool, Baltimore City Archives, Mahool
Files, File 475 (April 6, 1911).
92. Baltimore, Md., Ordinance 654 (Apr. 7, 1911).
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Approximately a month after its adoption, the City Council re-
pealed the second segregation ordinance and reenacted it with amend-
ments. The text of the ordinance remained essentially the same; the
purpose of the reenactment was to cure a technical flaw in enactment.
The Council added two new provisions: neither black schools nor black
churches could be established in white blocks and vice versa.93 Mahool
signed the third segregation ordinance on May 15, 1911, as his last offi-
cial act. The next day he was replaced in office by regular Democrat
James H. Preston, who had defeated Mahool's bid for reelection in the
1911 Democratic primary.
A challenge to Baltimore's third segregation ordinance was two
years in coming. A criminal indictment was filed against John E.
Gurry, "a colored person," charging that he had unlawfully moved into
a residence on an all-white block. Gurry was defended in the Criminal
Court of Baltimore City by W. Ashbie Hawkins,94 a Negro, who was to
play an active role in legally attacking the segregation ordinances. 95
At trial the court dismissed the indictment against Gurry, finding
the ordinance nonsensical. Judge Elliott focused on sections 1 and 2 of
the ordinance. According to his interpretation, section 1 excluded
whites from blocks "in whole or in part" black, and section 2 excluded
blacks from blocks "in whole or in part" white.96 Hence, he concluded,
the ordinance would depopulate mixed blocks by precluding whites
and blacks alike from moving there. Therefore, the ordinance must fail
because of its own unreasonableness.97
The ordinance, of course, could be interpreted another way. Law-
yer Marbury intended for it to exclude blacks from blocks "in whole or
in part" residential, where all the residences are occupied by whites.
The Maryland Court of Appeals rescued Marbury from his circumlo-
cution by adopting this interpretation, which permits either blacks or
whites to move onto mixed blocks.9" The Maryland high court had a
substantive quarrel with the ordinance, however. It found the ordi-
nance unconstitutional because it took away the vested rights of the
93. Baltimore, Md., Ordinance 692 (May 15, 1911).
94. State v. Gurry, 3 Baltimore City Ct. 262 (1913).
95. Hawkins came to Baltimore to attend Morgan College. Thereafter he attended the
University of Maryland Law School for a year before he transferred to Howard University
Law School. He later was associated in the practice of law with George W.F. McMechen,
who had broken the color line on McCulloh Street. See W. Ashbie Hawkins, Baltimore
Newspost, April 7, 1941 (Biography File, Enoch Pratt Free Library); 7 MORGAN ST. C.
BULL. 24, May 1941. For a contemporaneous account of these events, see Hawkins, supra
note 4, at 28-30.
96. Baltimore, Md., Ordinance 692 (May 15, 1911).
97. State v. Gurry, 3 Baltimore City Ct. at 263.
98. State v. Gurry, 121 Md. 534, 539, 88 A. 546, 548 (1913).
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owner of a dwelling to move into it if he happened to be white and the
block was all black, or vice versa.9 9
There was no lapse in coverage, however: a week before the
Maryland Court of Appeals struck down the third segregation ordi-
nance, the Baltimore City Council had enacted a fourth. The fourth
segregation ordinance cured the constitutional infirmity of its predeces-
sor by making its application prospective only; it provided "that noth-
ing herein contained shall be construed or operate to prevent any
person, who at the date of the passage of this ordinance, shall have
acquired a legal right to occupy, as a residence any building or portion
thereof. . from exercising such legal right . ... o
In the short run the segregation ordinances served the goal of their
proponents - the protection of Eutaw Place from a "Negro Inva-
sion '" 0 1 - while presenting blacks with few problems. To the con-
trary, blacks at first were able to buy or to rent at distress prices as
whites fled mixed blocks."i 2 The ordinances failed to accomplish the
more long term goals of the white majority, however, and eventually
worked a positive hardship on blacks, the effects of which are apparent
even today.
The ordinances did not succeed in protecting against crime and
contagion, the more general objectives of the white middle class. For
example, the ordinances had targeted the 17th Ward for degradation.
Its streets and alleys were "honeycombed with saloons and gambling
dens, as well as numerous billiard halls, dance halls and several broth-
els." 0 3 In the making was what modem sociologist Kenneth Clark was
to call the "pathologies of the ghetto."'" Blacks formed a self-help
organization, the Baltimore Colored Law and Order League, to pres-
sure municipal government to enforce liquor laws, but to little avail. 0 5
Rowdyism and theft increased in frequency and spread to surrounding
99. Id. at 550-51, 88 A. at 553 (holding that the state legislature had never authorized the
city to pass such an unreasonable ordinance).
100. Baltimore, Md. Ordinance 339 (Sept. 25, 1913).
101. A black real estate dealer described this development as follows:
The crowding among the colored people, especially in the 17th Ward is greatly on the
increase . . . .They have been moving rapidly into the 17th Ward and packing it.
Normally they would have spread over all of McCulloh Streets [sic] and the larger
streets in this Ward and the district to the northwest. This movement has been pre-
vented by the artificial pressure of the Segregation Act.
Transcript of interview with William L. Fitzgerald, R.G. 102, Box 121, National Archives
(June 28, 1916).
102. Hawkins, supra note 4, at 30.
103. W. Paul, supra note 4, at 393.
104. K. CLARK, DARK GHETTO DILEMMAS OF SOCIAL POWER 12-20 (1965).
105. W. Paul, supra note 4, at 397.
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areas, both as a product of and a reaction against this environment., 0 6
Thus, creation of a black ghetto increased crime in the contiguous
white neighborhoods.
Housing segregation also failed to protect the white community
from contagion. The mortality rate among Negroes from tuberculosis
remained 260% higher than that of whites and the death rate from all
diseases ninety-six percent higher than that of whites.' 7 H.L. Mencken
directly commented on the segregation ordinance's negative effect on
public health:
But who ever heard of a plan for decent housing for negroes in
Baltimore? Most of them live in filthy hovels, crowded together in
the winter, breeding diseases in themselves and constantly com-
municating these diseases to the rest of us. The persons who gov-
ern us have never thought to look to this matter. When the darky
tries to move out of his sty and into human habitation a policeman
now stops him. The law practically insists that he keep on incu-
bating typhoid and tuberculosis - that he keep these infections
alive . . . for the delight and benefit of the whole town.' 08
Even Mayor James H. Preston, who after replacing Mayor Mahool be-
came a great proponent of the segregation ordinance, conceded that it
failed to protect the public health of the white middle-class:
[T]he evil effects of the unhealthy state of the negro race are not
confined within their own numbers. With little if any knowledge
of their home surrounding we call upon these people to serve us in
our households, prepare our food, tend our children and perform
countless other services wherein personal contact is a matter of
course. Regardless of our efforts to maintain [a] sanitary and
healthful environment for ourselves and families the insidious in-
fluence of slum conditions is carried into our very midst to defile
and destroy.' ° 9
In short, the ordinances failed to segregate germs in the 17th Ward.
The ordinances also were disastrous for Baltimore's black commu-
nity because their effect was to limit further the overall housing supply
available to an increasing black population. An economist asked to
guess the likely impact of a law which limited the supply of housing for
which there was an increasing demand would make two prophecies -
106. Id.
107. Preston, What Can Be Done to Improve the Living Conditions of Baltimore's Negro
Population? 5 BALTIMORE MUN. J. 1, I (March 16, 1917).
108. H.L. Mencken, I The Free Lance 137 (1911-1915) (unpublished collection found in
Mencken Room, Enoch Pratt Free Library, Baltimore).
109. Preston, supra note 107, at 1.
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the price of Negro housing would increase, and the quality of Negro
housing would decline. Both came to pass. Although the ordinances at
first made some housing available to blacks as whites abandoned their
homes on mixed blocks, only a limited number of mixed blocks existed
and the pressure for additional Negro housing was unrelenting. The
Negro population in Baltimore was 85,000 in 1910. It had been in-
creasing by approximately 600 per year during the previous decade,"10
yet the additional housing available to blacks was being exhausted. A
growing population was "bottled-up" into a limited number of
houses. I I
On the surface the segregation ordinances do not seem designed to
shrink black housing opportunities. Indeed, the ordinances permitted
the creation of new all-black subdivisions. But circumstances con-
spired to foreclose this possibility. New housing was financed largely
by building and loan associations created by ethnic groups and labor
unions that refused to extend credit to Negroes. By 1900 there was
only one black building and loan association. 12 Even if a black family
could find the capital, few blacks could afford new housing. According
to census figures from 1910, which show home ownership among Ne-
groes in seventy-three southern cities with a black population of 5,000
or over, Baltimore ranked seventy-second. Only 933 of the city's
85,000 blacks owned their homes." 3 Finally, even if a group of mid-
dle-class blacks could be found who could afford new housing on the
outskirts of town, they were likely to receive a hostile reception from
white neighbors. 1"4
For example, a move of Morgan College to the northeast suburbs
encountered great opposition. Residents resisted the plan to create a
community of "scientifically sanitary" housing for the black faculty;
the president of the local community association declared his prefer-
ence to live near a community of "ignorant and tractable negroes"
rather than one of "educated negroes."' 'I During this period "Patap-
sco Park" was advertised in the Afro-American newspaper as "the only
suburb strictly for colored people.""' 6 But for most blacks, second-
110. CHILDREN'S BUREAU STUDY, supra note II, at 2-3.
Il1. Transcript of interview with S.C. Fernandez, R.G. 102, Box 121, National Archives
(June 19, 1916).
112. S. OLSON, supra note 8, at 234-35.
113. CHILDREN'S BUREAU STUDY, supra note It, at 33.
114. Transcript of interview with Dr. J.0. Spencer, R.G. 102, Box 12 1, National Archives
(June 20, 1916).
115. S. OLSON, supra note 8, at 278; transcript of interview with William L. Fitzgerald,
R.G. 102, Box 121, National Archives (June 28, 1916).
116. CHILDREN'S BUREAU STUDY, supra note 1l, at 33.
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hand houses were the only option.
Increased demand and a limited supply naturally results in rising
prices. By 1916 various observers noted, and three different studies
confirmed,' " that blacks were forced to pay more than whites for hous-
ing. As blacks dispossessed whites on mixed blocks, the rents went up.
Dr. J.O. Spencer, President of Morgan College, tells of a case where a
black family moved into a house that previously had been rented to
whites for $27.50 per month and were charged $32.00.'"1
As the price went up, the quality of housing in black neighbor-
hoods was inexorably declining. In a market characterized by in-
creased demand, a limited housing stock, and rising cost, Negroes had
no choice but to crowd together in order to make the rent. '9 Even the
small alley houses were turned into tenements for three or more fami-
lies. In 1913, the director of the National League on Urban Conditions
Among Negroes described what was happening in the picturesque
slang of that period: "For the poorer and less thrifty element. . . loose
building regulations allow greedy landlords to profit by 'gun-barrel'
shanties and cottages, by 'arks' of which the typical pigeon-house
would be a construction model, and by small houses crowded upon the
same lot." 12
0
Baltimore's middle-class black neighborhood also was under seige.
Established in the 14th Ward along upper Druid Hill Avenue, it had
been "mixed" when the segregation ordinances went into effect. A
quiet residential neighborhood with stately three-story town houses,
W.E.B. DuBois described Druid Hill Avenue as "one of the best
colored streets in America."' 2 1 Its middle-class inhabitants had the
same aspirations as their white neighbors - they sought to distance
themselves from the crime, contagion, and squalor of the slums. But
the segregation ordinances fated the neighborhood eventually to be-
come a slum. Speculators outbid homeowners for the houses and con-
verted them into tenements for three or more families. A familiar
pattern repeated itself: As the lower-class population grew, entreprenu-
ers established saloons, gambling places, and brothels. The black bour-
geoisie resisted through such self-help organizations as the Baltimore
Colored Law and Order League, but it was at best a holding action. 122
117. See S. OLSON, supra note 8, at 277, and authorities cited therein.
118. Transcript of interview with Dr. J.0. Spencer, R.G. 102, Box 121 National Archives
(June 20, 1916).
119. CHILDREN'S BUREAU STUDY, supra note 11, at 32; Transcript of interview with Wil-
liam L. Fitzgerald, R.G. 102, Box 121, National Archives (June 28, 1916).
120. Haynes, supra note 5, at I 1!.
121. S. OLSON, supra note 8, at 277.
122. W. Paul, supra note 4, at 397.
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Notwithstanding this negative assessment of the effects of the seg-
regation ordinances, they were popular with white citizenry. Dollars
dictated this positive response. In a letter to Mayor Preston in 1916,
Reverend W.J. McMillian, the pastor of the Maryland Avenue Presby-
terian Church, expressed the views of the white majority:
Personally I believe that the segregation matter is one of the great-
est problems of the modem municipality. The proximity of the
negro race to good property means its undoing. This is the fact
with which we must deal rather than concerning ourselves with the
theories that race prejudice ought not to be. Personally I believe
that the property of the church which I serve has been injured
$5,000 in the last twelve months by the negroes' getting the block
on Oak Street between 24th and 25th Streets. 23
Mayor Preston summed up the official attitude in a letter to the Presi-
dent of the New York Title and Mortgage Company: "Our segregation
ordinance is acting admirably in Baltimore, in operation and effect -
and has very great influence on property values and on the condition of
both races." 1
24
The "Baltimore idea" for promoting residential segregation was
quickly adopted in other southern and border cities. In 1912 Moores-
ville and Winston-Salem, North Carolina enacted segregation ordi-
nances. One year later Asheville, North Carolina; Richmond, Norfolk,
and Roanoke, Virginia; Atlanta, Georgia; Madisonville, Kentucky; and
Greenville, South Carolina passed similar legislation. And in 1914
Louisville, Kentucky; Birmingham, Alabama; and St. Louis, Missouri
followed suit.
125
Indeed the success of residential segregation ordinances was the
catalyst for the emergence of the National Association for the Ad-
vancement of Colored People as an effective counterforce to segrega-
tion. The NAACP had been founded in 1909.126 But its membership
and political power grew as it established local branches to press court
challenges to the segregation ordinances. 127 The success of these chal-
lenges varied: The North Carolina Supreme Court had struck down an
ordinance as a violation of property rights;128 Georgia's Supreme Court
123. Letter from the Rev. W.J. McMillan to Mayor Preston, Baltimore City Archives,
Preston Files, File 506 (Jan. 18, 1916).
124. Letter from Mayor Preston, Baltimore City Archives, Preston Files, File 506 (Mar.
17, 1917).
125. Schmidt, supra note 74, at 499-500.
126. Rice, supra note 2, at 182.
127. Schmidt, supra note 74, at 503.
128. State v. Darnell, 166 N.C. 300, 81 S.E. 338 (1914); (city charter authorized aldermen
to enact any ordinance they deem proper for city's good order and general welfare so long as
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vacillated, first rejecting, 29 then approving, 130 different versions of At-
lanta's ordinance; and the Virginia Court of Appeals sustained its ordi-
nances with some qualifications.' 3'
As we have already seen, the Baltimore branch of the NAACP,
under the leadership of W. Ashbie Hawkins, had successfully attacked
an early version of Baltimore's segregation ordinance. 32 Hawkins'
plan to take a constitutional challenge to the United States Supreme
Court had been postponed by this success. But in 1915, Hawkins again
started up the judicial ladder when he challenged, before the Maryland
Court of Appeals, the constitutionality of Thomas S. Jackson's criminal
conviction for violation of Baltimore's fourth segregation ordinance.
33
At the request of Mayor Preston, William L. Marbury filed a brief in
support of the city's position. Preston remained apprehensive; he wrote
to Marbury: "In this brief there is a page and a half of argument. It
seems to me that this is too important a matter to be 'kissed down the
wind' so lightly."' 34 Mayor Preston went on to request his City Solici-
tor, S.S. Field, to file an additional brief in support of the constitution-
ality of the segregation ordinance.
The Maryland Court of Appeals postponed its decision in the case
pending a decision by the United States Supreme Court in a closely
related case. In 1914, the City of Louisville, Kentucky had passed a
segregation ordinance of its own. The text of the Louisville ordinance
closely resembled the text of the first segregation ordinance which
Milton Dashiell had drafted for Baltimore. The ordinance made it un-
lawful for blacks to reside in residential blocks more than fifty percent
white and vice versa.' 35
The Supreme Court case was a product of the efforts of the
NAACP's national headquarters. The NAACP had formed a Louis-
the ordinance did not contravene state constitution and its laws, and did not authorize enact-
ment of racial segregation ordinance).
129. Carey v. City of Atlanta, 143 Ga. 192, 84 S.E. 456 (1915); (city's racial segregation
ordinance violated due process clauses of both the state constitution and the fourteenth
amendment to the federal constitution, because it denied a person's inherent right to ac-
quire, to enjoy, and to dispose of property).
130. Harden v. City of Atlanta, 147 Ga. 248, 93 S.E. 401 (1917); (city's racial segregation
ordinance, by its terms applicable only prospectively, did not violate due process).
131. Hopkins v. City of Richmond, 117 Va. 692, 86 S.E. 139 (1915); (enactment of racial
segregation ordinance is within the city's police power to promote peace and good order,
and ordinance is constitutional insofar as it is applied only to persons whose property rights
accrued after its enactment).
132. See supra text accompanying notes 94-95.
133. Jackson v. State, 132 Md. 311, 103 A. 910 (1918).
134. Letter from Mayor Preston to William L. Marbury (Nov. 29, 1915), Baltimore City
Archives, Preston Files, File 506.
135. Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917).
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ville branch and had recruited prominent local counsel, but orchestrat-
ed the litigation from its New York office. With the assistance of the
local black leaders and white members of the Louisville Real Estate
Exchange, it created a test case in the context least favorable to the
ordinance's unconstitutionality. 3
6
The scenario had William Warley, president of the Louisville
branch of the NAACP, contract to buy a comer lot from Charles
Buchanan, a white real estate agent. The lot in question was in a
"white block" but was surrounded by black residences. The contract
provided that Warley was not required to perform "unless I have the
right under the laws of the State of Kentucky and the City of Louisville
to occupy said property as a residence."'' 37 Buchanan sought specific
performance of the contract in the state courts and Warley set up the
ordinance as his excuse for not performing. The state courts held the
Louisville ordinance constitutional and therefore a complete defense to
Warley. 138
Hence the case of Buchanan v. Warley had been staged to work a
role reversal. Buchanan, the plaintiff challenging the constitutionality
of the ordinance, was a white real estate agent. Warley, the defendant
defending the ordinance, was the black president of the Louisville
branch of the NAACP. The explanation of this litigation strategy is
straightforward. At the turn of the twentieth century the U.S. Supreme
Court had come to accept Jim Crow laws: in Plessy v. Ferguson,39
decided in 1896, the Court found state law requiring racial segregation
on railroads consistent with the fourteenth amendment; and in Berea
College v. Kentucky, 4' decided in 1908, it found that the state of Ken-
tucky had the power to require racial segregation in a private college.
But during this same era the Court had actively embraced the credo of
"economic laissez-faire." In 1905, in Lochner v. New York,' 4 ' the
Court constitutionally protected freedom of contract in the baking
business from maximum-hour legislation. In Buchanan, the NAACP
hoped to convince the Court to protect Buchanan's constitutional right
to engage in the real estate business without meddlesome interference
from the City of Louisville (and thereby incidentally to protect blacks
from residential housing segregation).
136. See generally Rice, supra note 2, at 183-88 (a detailed discussion of Buchanan's his-
torical background). See also Schmidt, supra note 74, at 498 (summary of the decision).
137. Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. at 70 (quoting contract).
138. Schmidt, supra note 74, at 498.
139. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
140. 211 U.S. 45 (1908).
141. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
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Buchanan v. Warley was first argued before the Supreme Court in
April of 1916 before seven justices. The Court then ordered reargu-
ment before a full bench. The significance of the case was well recog-
nized; twelve amicus briefs were filed on both sides. From Baltimore,
City Solicitor Field filed a brief defending the ordinance, while W.
Ashbie Hawkins (who had hoped himself to argue a case challenging
the Baltimore ordinance before the Supreme Court) filed a brief on
behalf of the Baltimore NAACP. 4 2 The case was reargued and the
Court finally rendered a decision in November of 1917.
The NAACP's litigation strategy almost back-fired. Justice
Holmes prepared a dissent in which he argued that the case should be
dismissed because of its collusive nature. Holmes said: "The contract
sounds so very like a wager upon the constitutionality of the ordinance
that I cannot but feel a doubt whether the suit should be entertained
without some evidence that this is not a manufactured case.' 43 But
Holmes decided not to deliver his dissent and a unanimous Court held
the Louisville housing segregation ordinance unconstitutional.'
44
The NAACP's tactic had worked. Justice Day's opinion empha-
sized Buchanan's property right to dispose of his lot as he saw fit.1
45
Also in the opinion, however, were expressions of concern for the rights
of Negroes. Day found "the difficult problem arising from a feeling of
race hostility" an insufficient basis for depriving citizens of their consti-
tutional rights to acquire and to use property without state legislation
discriminating against them on the sole basis of color. 146 From today's
perspective the opinion seems analytically imprecise. The Court inter-
twined Buchanan's right to substantive due process with Warley's right
to equal protection. 47 But the opinion served perfectly the NAACP's
purpose. The Supreme Court was afforded a mechanism through
which it could squelch residential segregation laws without overruling
recent precedents that had sustained racial segregation in transporta-
tion and schools.
Nationwide, the black press exulted in the Buchanan decision. ' 41
The BaltimoreAfro-American editorialized: "The joy in Bunkville [sic]
when home run Casey came to bat in the final inning of a famous game
with the bases loaded is nothing compared with the rejoicing in Balti-
142. Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. at 68-69.
143. Schmidt, supra note 74, at 512.
144. Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917).
145. Id. at 79.
146. Id. at 80-82.
147. Schmidt, supra note 74, at 517-23.
148. Id. at 508.
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more, Richmond, St. Louis and other Southern towns over the outcome
of the Louisville Segregation decision."'' 49 Law reviews from all parts
of the country generally were critical of the decision. The critics were
unable to see how segregation could be reasonable in transportation
and education but not in housing.'t5  An interested observer, Baltimore
City Solicitor Field, lamented in the Virginia Law Review the "modern
tendency to look upon property rights as more sacred than personal
rights"'' (i.e., the property right of blacks to acquire and use property
free from racial discrimination versus the personal right of whites to
discriminate on the basis of race).
The Maryland Court of Appeals responded promptly. Just three
months after the Supreme Court decision, it rendered an opinion in
Jackson v. State, striking down the Baltimore segregation ordinance on
the grounds that it and the Louisville ordinance were "essentially alike
in theory and purpose."' 11 2 The court concluded: "It is thus definitely
settled, upon highest authority, that the right of the individual citizen to
acquire or use property can not be validly restricted, by State or munic-
ipality, on the ground of his color."'
' 53
Black Baltimoreans seized the opportunity to renew their move-
ment into white neighborhoods. Two black families moved into the
1100 block of Bolton Street, one of the oldest middle-class residential
sections of the city; another family moved into the 1200 block of Mc-
Culloh Street.' 54 White Baltimoreans responded with petulance and
frustration. Miss Alice J. Reilley asked, "What is the use of trying to
beautify a city or put in any civic improvements if Negroes are to ac-
quire all of the property?" 5
5
Mayor Preston was undaunted. He sought the advice of Dr. A.K.
Warner of Chicago, where plans for keeping Negroes out of white terri-
tory were in effect.' 56 In addition to pursuing the Chicago Plan, Mayor
Preston conceived of another "radical measure" to complement his
plan for segregation. He proposed "the elimination of certain conjested
sections, populated by Negroes, in which has been noted a very high
149. Baltimore Afro-American, November 10, 1917, quoted in Rice, supra note 2, at 194.
150. Schmidt, supra note 74, at 509-11; Rice, supra note 2, at 195-96.
151. Field, The Constitutionaliiy 0fSegregation Ordinances, 5 VA. L. REv. 81, 84 (1917).
152. 132 Md. at 312, 103 A. at 910.
153. Id. at 316, 103 A. at 911.
154. Undated newspaper clippings, Baltimore City Archives, Preston Files, File 506.
155. Letter from Alice J. Reilly to James H. Preston, Baltimore City Archives, Preston
Files, File 506.
156. Letter from Real Estate Bd. to James H. Preston (July 20, 1918), Baltimore City
Archives, Preston Files, File 106.
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percentage of deaths from . . . communicable diseases."' 57
It is doubtful that Preston appreciated the irony of his requesting
advice from Dr. Warner. Chicago was then undergoing widespread ri-
oting in response to Negro movement into white neighborhoods.
Before it was over there would be fifty-eight bomb explosions, two Ne-
groes dead, many people of both races injured, and property damage in
excess of $100,000.158 Chicago was a peculiar place to seek advice for
one whose avowed purpose was improving race relations.
Nevertheless, Preston determined to implement the Chicago Plan.
It was a simple one. The plan was "to forc[e] out the blacks already
residing in [white] neighborhoods and [to ensure] that no others en-
tered. The activities of [the white property owners' association] con-
sisted both of mass meetings to arouse the neighborhood residents
against the blacks and the publication in white journals of scathing de-
nunciations of the race."' 59 The auspices of the Real Estate Board of
Baltimore, the City Building Inspector, and the Health Department
also would be employed to discourage "block busting." In essence,
Preston proposed to replace de jure segregation with de facto segrega-
tion, enforced by a conspiracy in restraint of rental or sale to Negroes.
The plan for segregation passed its first test. In August of 1918
Mayor Preston became aware that Louis Buckner, owner of the house
at 649 Lee Street, proposed to rent to Negroes the second floor flat of
his three-story house in an all-white neighborhood. When asked if he
did not feel he was being inconsiderate to others in the block, Buckner
responded: "They do not pay my way, I must look out for myself."'
161
He was visited by the Secretary of the Real Estate Board of Baltimore
and at the Mayor's behest, by the Inspector of Buildings for Baltimore.
Buckner was counselled against the rental and that if the rental went
through he would be cited for any code violations. Finally, at a meet-
ing between Buckner and the Real Estate Board, Buckner assured the
Board's members that he would not rent to blacks. 16 1
Slum clearance-Mayor Preston's own "radical measure"-was
not a new idea. Years before, the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad had used
its condemnation powers to dispossess one hundred black families
157. Needfor Better Housingfor Negroes Revealed in Tuberculosis Statistics, 5 BALTI-
MORE MUN. J. 5 (Aug. 10, 1917).
158. CHICAGO COMM'N ON RACE RELATIONS, THE NEGRO IN CHICAGO 122-23 (1922),
quoted in Johnson, supra note 2, at 178.
159. W. TuT-rLE, JR., RACE RIOT-CHICAGO IN THE RED SUMMER OF 1919 171 (1972).
160. Letter from Real Estate Bd. of Baltimore to James H. Preston (Aug. 16, 1918), Balti-
more City Archives, Preston Files, File 106.
161. Letter from Real Estate Bd. of Baltimore to James H. Preston (Aug. 22, 1918), Balti-
more City Archives, Preston Files, File 106.
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when expanding its railyard in South Baltimore. 162 But Preston pro-
posed to use the strategy in a more calculated fashion. The Commis-
sion on Housing Conditions would convert "the worst infected blocks"
into parks. 163
The first public slum clearance project provided for "the parking
of St. Paul and Courtland Streets" between Lexington and Centre
Streets. The city began in 1914 to buy up properties that were used as
third-rate rooming houses and cheap flats. 'I Eventually, in 1917, pro-
ceeds from a harbor loan were used to hire landscape architect Thomas
Hastings, who replaced Courtland Street with a sunken garden and
widened St. Paul Street. The project was intended to improve the traf-
fic flow, as well as to eliminate a downtown slum. 65 When completed
in 1919, some Baltimoreans called it Preston's Folly, others called it
Preston Gardens. 1
66
Hence, in the aftermath of Buchanan v. Warley, the Baltimore plan
for segregation had come to consist of two discrete strategies - clear-
ance and containment. Clearance was used to remove Negro slums
from areas where they were not wanted; containment was used to pre-
vent the spread of black residential districts.
The plan for segregation went into operation at a tumultuous time.
Following World War I, Baltimore was undergoing dramatic growth.
In 1918 the city had added a new annex which tripled its area. Be-
tween 1920 and 1930 the city's population rose from 730,000 to one
million. In that period, housing starts peaked at 6,000 per year, most of
them in the new area.
Along with this growth came a redefinition of "race spaces." Ne-
groes continued to pour into Baltimore from the countryside, but re-
strictive immigration laws had stopped the influx of Europeans.
Population in the new annex doubled.' 67 Although the white middle
class was in the vanguard of the exodus to the suburbs, by 1930 they
had been joined by the foreign-born. The Negro population in the old
city increased from fifteen percent to thirty percent, while white popu-
lation in the old city decreased by one-half.168 Baltimore was becom-
ing a black center surrounded by a white ring. The racial Social
162. See supra note 10.
163. See Need/or Better Housingfor Negroes Revealed in Tuberculosis Statistics, 5 BALTI-
MORE MUN. J. 5 (Aug. 10, 1917).
164. Kelly, "The Birth of Preston Gardens," Baltimore Sun, May 9, 1954 (found in verti-
cal file Parks, Baltimore, Preston Gardens, in Enoch Pratt Free Library).
165. The Parking of St. Paul and Courtland Streets, 7 BALTIMORE MUN. J. 5 (May 23,
1919); see also 5 BALTIMORE MUN. J. 4 (Oct. 5, 1917).
166. Kelly, supra note 164.
167. S. OLSON, supra note 8, at 302-03.
168. Id. at 324-25.
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Darwinists who had been instrumental in proposing residential segre-
gation had assumed that Negroes would constitute a declining percent-
age of the population. 6 9 In the old Baltimore City the opposite was
proving to be the case.
The exodus of whites to the new annex ameliorated crowding in
black housing. Most families lived in a separate house with less than
one person per room. 170 In the short run the problem was quality, not
quantity. A 1933 study found that Baltimore's "blighted" areas - ar-
eas in which the physical condition of dwellings is below the standard
for rehabilitation, and with substantial health and sanitary problems-
were predominantly populated by blacks. 17  These districts received
few municipal services. Garbage and refuse went uncollected. Alleys
were infested with rats. The sewer system had been completed in 1914,
but many houses in the 17th Ward were still not connected; it is said
that building inspectors were bribed.172 When toilets were installed, in
some small houses there was so little space they were placed next to the
front door.' 73 The vast majority of the Negro population continued to
live under unsanitary conditions, to infect one another, and to spread
communicable diseases to the broader community.
It was in this setting that the city undertook to clear "pest holes."
One such effort was the construction of a Negro school on one-half of
the Biddle Alley district - the old "lung block." The black commu-
nity objected that because substitute housing was not provided, such
projects merely removed poor blacks from one slum to another. 174
Although improved public health continued to be used as a justifi-
cation for slum clearance projects, this justification was not taken too
seriously. Knowledgeable observers recognized that clearance projects
merely crowded the displaced population into other blighted areas. A
1934 study prepared for Mayor Howard W. Jackson provided a more
candid rationalization: blighted black areas close to the downtown
commercial district and white neighborhoods yield declining tax
reserves and are a nuisance. Therefore, the public interest would be
served by their replacement with white housing or industry. 17
169. See supra text accompanying notes 74-76.
170. S. OLSON, supra note 8, at 325-26.
17 1. IRA DEA. REID, SUMMARY REPORT: THE NEGRO COMMUNITY OF BALTIMORE 27-28
(1934).
172. Interview with Mrs. Eugene R. Smith, instructor at Morgan College, R.G. 102, Box
121, National Archives (June 20, 1916).
173. Id.
174. S. OLSON, supra note 8, at 326.
175. W.W. EMMART, REPORT ON HOUSING AND COMMERCIAL CONDITIONS IN BALTI-
MORE, CONSTITUTING A STUDY PREPARED FOR MAYOR HOWARD W. JACKSON (1934).
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Another study, prepared under the auspices of the Joint Commit-
tee on Housing created by the State Advisory Board of the Federal
Emergency Administration of Public Works, considered the feasibility
of the rehabilitation for six particular blighted areas. 176 The planners
selected these six areas because they were close to better areas, served
by an adequate transportation system, and would contribute to the cost
of existing streets, schools, sewers, and utilities.'77 The study recom-
mended restoration and modernization for white habitation of three of
the areas, even though all six were primarily populated by blacks. 78 In
two areas found suitable for black housing, the buildings had decayed
"beyond the point of even low level Negro occupancy,"' 79 the sites had
"no other value except for Negro residence and never will have,"'8 °
and were "certainly only usable for Negro habitation unless commerce
and industry can absorb it, which seems doubtful .. ."lI The study
was criticized by an Urban League analyst as promoting "newer, bigger
and better slums.' 1 82 In any case, the removal of blacks from areas
where they proved inconvenient or expensive to the white majority had
become part of the plan for segregation.
Containment was the other strategy. We have already discussed
how, when de jure segregation failed, de facto segregation was imple-
mented through a conspiracy which restrained residential sales or rent-
als to Negroes in white neighborhoods. Once the conspiracy was in
place it grew and formalized. Originally it was enforced through peer
pressure from neighbors, administrative harassment by housing and
health inspectors, and by the suasion of the Baltimore Real Estate
Board. Later this conspiracy came to be institutionalized.
In 1922 the National Association of Real Estate Brokers
(NAREB), of which the Baltimore Board was a member, published a
textbook entitled Principles of Real Estate Practice. The textbook em-
phasized that "the purchase of property by certain racial types is very
likely to diminish the value of other property."' 183 It was deemed un-
ethical to sell blacks property that was located in white neighborhoods.
As recently as 1950 the NAREB's code of ethics provided:
176. Report ofthe Joint Committee on Housing in Baltimore, THE BALTIMORE ENGINEER 6
(Jan. 1934).
177. Id. at 6-7.
178. Id. at 8-10.
179. Id. at 8.
180. ld.
181. Id. at 9.
182. Reid, supra note 171, at 32.
183. U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, UNDERSTANDING FAIR HOUSING 3 (Clearinghouse
Pub. No. 42, 1973).
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The realtor should not be instrumental in introducing into a neigh-
borhood a character of property or occupancy, members of any
race or nationality or any individual whose presence will clearly
be detrimental to property values in the neighborhood. 8 4
In the 1930's the new housing market was in Baltimore's annex
where row houses were being built. These houses were sold to whites
only. It would have been considered foolhardy to sell to blacks and
whites in the same row. Some builders perpetuated this restriction by
placing restrictive covenants in the deeds prohibiting resale to
blacks.'85 The Maryland Court of Appeals upheld the enforcement of
racial restrictions under the fourteenth amendment, because the dis-
crimination was private rather than public.8 6
Mortgage lenders joined in the conspiracy. Traditionally in Balti-
more, most house purchases were financed by mutual savings and loan
associations, which discriminated against blacks. Credit unions for
ethnic and white church groups, and for work organizations (e.g.,
B&O), also excluded blacks from participating.8 7 And when general
banking institutions began to extend mortgage credit they "redlined"
black and integrated neighborhoods as unstable and risky. Later, in
the 1930's when the federal government became active in housing
fields, it denied Federal Housing Administration support in neighbor-
hoods with "inharmonious racial groups."'' 88
In Baltimore in 1934 the 3,800 middle-class black families who
could afford to own a house were those most immediately affected by
the conspiracy of containment. If they already owned a home it was
likely to be in the upper Druid Hill Avenue district, which still was
"the best that Negroes could get in the city proper."'8 9 Yet the neigh-
borhood was in some respects unsatisfactory: it was noisy as a result of
street cars, lacked recreational facilities, was removed from shopping
facilities, and had areas of improper sanitation. Moreover, it was un-
dergoing change. The neighborhood had been encroached upon by
brothels and saloons. Landlords were outbidding individuals for some
of its large houses with a view toward creation of tenements. Black
homeowners attempting to escape these problems had no place to go. 190
Those Negroes attempting to buy their first house were similarly
184. Id.
185. S. OLSON, supra note 8, at 325.
186. Meade v. Dennistone, 173 Md. 295, 301, 196 A. 330, 333 (1938).
187. S. OLSON, supra note 8, at 325.
188. U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, UNDERSTANDING FAIR HOUSING 4-5 (Clearing-
house Pub. No. 42, 1973).
189. Reid, supra note 171, at 33.
190. Id. at 33-34.
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frustrated. The housing boom of the mid-20's had been for whites
only. The economic depression had brought the housing industry to a
standstill - during 1934 only 119 houses were built in Baltimore. 9 '
The only recent development for blacks had been Morgan Park, for the
faculty of Morgan College next to its new campus. Conventional
financing likewise was nonexistent. One nonconventional response was
known as the Homemakers' Building and Loan Association. It was a
cooperative organized in the 1930's by the Interracial Commission with
power to buy, sell, lease, manage, and build. It invested $35,000 con-
verting one house into modern apartments and selling other houses to
stockholders before disappearing from the pages of history. ' 92 But by-
in-large, the plan for segregation denied the black bourgeoisie a spa-
cious house on a quiet street.
Hence, once the plan for segregation was in effect, Baltimore's
housing market had achieved a dynamic equilibrium of two markets -
one white and the other black. "Respectable" real estate dealers and
financing institutions were active only in the white market.' 93 Balti-
more was among the nation's leaders in white ownership. The black
market (except for the 300 houses built in Morgan Park) was second-
hand houses. Negro houses were in the older portion of the city in
"blighted districts." The city from time to time demolished black slums
if they became a nuisance. It proposed construction of public housing
for the poor, but never carried through with the proposals. 94
Baltimore's housing market was to retain most of these character-
istics for the next 30 years. But one inexorable force for change re-
mained: between 1930 and 1960 Baltimore's black population grew
from 142,000 to 326,000."9 The market described above made no al-
lowance for increasing the number of black housing units. This gap
was widened by actions of the city government. Between 1930 and
1960 programs of school building, slum clearance, urban renewal, and
expressway construction displaced large numbers of households.196 Be-
tween 1951 and 1971 alone, 75,000 people were removed, and eighty to
ninety percent of them were Negroes. During this same period the city
had various public housing programs, but by 1976 only 15,000 public
191. S. OLSON, supra note 8, at 303.
192. Reid, supra note 171, at 34.
193. See S. OLSON, supra note 8, at 325.
194. Id. at 326.
195. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, ABSTRACT OF THE FIFTEENTH
CENSUS OF THE UNITED STATES 104 (1933 ed. reprint 1976); BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S.
DEP'T OF COMMERCE, CENSUS OF POPULATION: 1960, PART 22, MARYLAND 178 (1961).
196. S. OLSON, supra note 8, at 377.
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housing units were available. 197 Hence, the city exaggerated the
shortage by demolishing many more houses than it created.
"Blockbusting" was the answer. Economists have commented
upon the difficulty of enforcing multi-party agreements in restraint of
trade. The problem is simple: "The temptation of members to cheat is
strong . . . because the returns from cheating are substantial .... ."919
This certainly proved to be true in Baltimore's housing industry. The
treaty between white homeowners, the real estate industry, financiers,
and the Federal Housing Administration had left unmet the demand
for black housing. A house could be sold at a premium to a black
buyer by a seller willing to violate the treaty. Moreover, this premium
could be multiplied by real estate speculators who capitalized on the
panic in white neighborhoods that had begun to change in racial make-
up. Brokers bought whole blocks at a distress price from nervous white
sellers, and sold at a premium to housing-hungry black buyers.' 99
Later, speculators broadened their market. They used their credit
to borrow money from financial institutions. Turned-over houses were
then sold on easy terms to low-income, high-risk black buyers pursuant
to "buy-like-rent" contracts. The sales were often illusory; foreclosure
was the rule rather than the exception. The speculator would sell and
resell the same house to a series of buyers. By this technique the block-
busters took a profit from the under-class as well as the middle-class
Negroes. Blockbusting transferred tens of thousands of houses from
the white market to the black market.200
Blockbusting poses an ethical enigma. Its practitioners were out-
laws, violating the real estate industry's code of ethics and cheating on
the cartel between white homeowners, real estate dealers, mortgage
lenders, city government, and the FHA, which restrained the sale or
rental of housing to blacks in white neighborhoods. Speculators em-
ployed a psychology designed to scare white homeowners out of their
accumulated equities. They sold to black purchasers for whatever the
market would bear, sometimes exacting exorbitant profits. Conversely,
its practitioners were providing housing opportunities otherwise un-
available to Negroes. And the "ethical" precept which they violated
was part of a racist conspiracy. Speculators provided financing and
housing when mortgage lenders and "ethical" real estate brokers re-
197. Id at 53-54.
198. R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 115 (1972).
199. Douglas Connah, Jr., Run Baby, Run: Study of Blockbusting in Baltimore (Nov. 22,
1968) (unpublished manucript).
200. See S. OLSON, supra note 8, at 378-79 (discussing career of Morris Goldseker).
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fused to do so. The unsavory blockbuster or the respectable conspira-
tors: Who is to blame?
Although apartheid, Baltimore style, was doomed to failure, the
white body politic refused to accept defeat gracefully. It fought for the
city's territory district-by-district, neighborhood-by-neighborhood, and
block-by-block. In an effort to maintain de facto segregation in hous-
ing, it used the whole bag of tricks: Negro removal through slum clear-
ance, public works projects, and urban renewal; restrictive covenants
denying blacks access to "exclusive" white neighborhoods; refusal of
financing for black or integrated housing; and professional sanctions
against real estate brokers dealing with blacks in white neighborhoods.
But unrelenting demographic forces were increasing the black popula-
tion of Baltimore from fifteen to seventy percent. Over the long term
the dwindling white majority lacked both the political and economic
power to keep a restrictive cordon around the black community.
Once again it was the United States Supreme Court that cut the
knot. In 1948 the Court took the first step in Shelley v. Kraemer.20 It
ruled that the legal enforcement of private, racially restrictive cove-
nants was unconstitutional under the equal protection clause of the
fourteenth amendment. The Court conceded that the amendment was
directed only against state action and not private conduct, but found
that state judicial enforcement of private agreements brought them
within the amendment's purview.
Shelley was a setback for segregated housing, but for twenty years
the conspirators fought on, using the other tools of de facto segregation
- peer pressure, "redlining" of mortgages, and professional sanctions.
Finally, in 1968, the Supreme Court decided in Jones v. Mayer2"2 that
the 1866 Civil Rights law passed pursuant to the thirteenth amendment
bars all housing discrimination, private as well as public. This deci-
sion, taken along with the 1968 Federal Housing Law2"3 - which pro-
hibited discriminatory practices by real estate brokers, builders, and
lenders - dismantled the dual housing market. In Baltimore and in
the other urban areas that share much of this housing history, the white
market and the black market merged into one housing market.
Disappearance of the dual housing market does not mean that
housing is desegregated, that racial discrimination has been eliminated,
or that good housing is available for the poor. Residential housing in
Baltimore remains by-in-large segregated. In part this segregation is a
201. 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
202. 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
203. Civil Rights Act of 1968, Title VIII, §§ 801-819, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619 (1976) (as
amended).
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result of preference: Blacks and whites alike may prefer to live in their
old neighborhoods that developed in the days of de facto segregation.
Segregation also results from economics: The median black family in-
come is lower than that of whites, creating an economic barrier to entry
into more affluent areas. But the notion that blacks need only a larger
income to gain an equal choice of housing is inaccurate. Old practices
die hard; muted voices of discrimination persist in the real estate and
financing fields. Black buyers are steered to black neighborhoods, and
mortgage money is more readily available to whites. Studies show that
black families have less access to suburban housing than do white fam-
ilies of equivalent income.2°
Moreover, the power of local governments to select the site for
public projects may be used to perpetuate racial segregation. In the
1960's, expressways in Baltimore sought out the routes of least resist-
ance - black ghettos. When the roads were built, displaced residents
lacked reasonable relocation opportunities; when the roads were not
built, whole neighborhoods, such as Rosemont, were left desolate and
abandoned. In one instance the city took the houses in what had been
a working-class black neighborhood, condemned them for a highway
which was never built, and then created the fashionable Otterbein dis-
trict for the affluent professionals returning to reside in the gentrified
city. Class distinction, if not racial discrimination, influences the loca-
tion of public projects.
Finally, elimination of the dual housing market has done little to
improve the quality of housing available to low-income blacks. When
Baltimore's plan for segregation was first conceived, the building in-
dustry was providing low-income housing. Commercial builders ca-
tered to the dollar-a-day man. Tenements and flats were profitable
speculative ventures. 20 5 Negroes were excluded from these buildings
on racial grounds. Today the free market no longer produces low- and
moderate-income housing. Increased costs of energy, financing, and
construction price housing beyond the reach of the poor and near-poor.
Public and federally subsidized housing partially fill the void. But Bal-
timore's 15,000 public units, along with the various federally subsidized
units, fall far short of meeting the demand. And it is impossible to
locate a new subsidized low-income housing project without encounter-
ing outraged community opposition. Thus most of Baltimore's poor
(both black and white) continue to live under slum conditions.
204. U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, UNDERSTANDING FAIR HOUSING 15 (Clearing-
house No. 42, 1973).
205. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
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CONCLUSION
Historian Samuel P. Hays has said: "Local history if purely fac-
tual and descriptive, advances knowledge only in a rudimentary fash-
ion; but if local history can illuminate broad processes of social change
concretely, then it adds a dimension unobtainable through an emphasis
on top-level, nationwide personalities and events. ' 2°6 The preceding
account of the Baltimore segregation ordinances and their aftermath is
intended to achieve the latter goal. Baltimore's experience with resi-
dential housing segregation is by no means unique; with only minor
variation in scenario and cast it was played out in other cities that came
of age in the early twentieth century.
If this article's objective is attained, the details of the Baltimore
story will provide insight and lessons with broader implications. In-
deed, several aspects of Baltimore's history of housing segregation chal-
lenge conventional explanations of not only housing segregation itself,
but also, on a broader level, democracy, reform, and social change.
First, the facts and descriptions in this history call into question
free-market economic analysis of the causes of racial segregation.
Much of Baltimore's housing history follows the economist's script.
Economic theory would have predicted the development of slums as a
market response to the demand for inexpensive housing by a growing
population of low-income city dwellers. Moreover, fear of crime and
contagion predictably provided economic incentives for self-segrega-
tion by middle- and upper-income residents who responded with a
willingness to pay a premium to locate in-neighborhoods remote from
slums. Finally, separation by income level naturally will tend to result
in separation by race because blacks have lower average incomes than
whites and spend less on housing.2 °7
But some analyses go a step further and attempt to explain all resi-
dential segregation by race as individually motivated. For example,
economist Richard Muth argues that segregation is the natural result of
whites having a greater preference for segregation than blacks have for
integration. To make his model work, Muth must assume that middle-
class blacks are less averse to living in proximity to slums than middle-
class whites;20 8 otherwise one would expect to find middle-class black
families sprinkled throughout neighborhoods remote from slums. The
details of this study belie his assumption. We have documented the
206. Hays, Forward to R. LUBOVE, supra note 41, at ix-x.
207. See R. MUTH, URBAN ECONOMIC PROBLEMS 86-110 (1975).
208. Id. at 87, 94-100.
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efforts of the black bourgeoisis (e.g., George W.F. McMechen, the
Morgan College faculty, the Baltimore Colored Law and Order
League), to remove themselves from the vicinity of slums. In Balti-
more, the aversion to crime and contagion knew no color line.
Muth also rejects the possibility that a conspiracy between home
owners, real estate agents, mortgage lenders, and local government offi-
cials limited the availability of housing to blacks. The conspiracy argu-
ment cannot be taken "very seriously" he says, because each individual
in the urban housing market would have a profit incentive not to join
it: "[b]y not doing so he avoids his share of the costs of the conspiracy,
but, having a negligible effect on the outcome, shares in its benefits."2 "9
Notwithstanding Muth's rejection, our study shows that a dual housing
market in fact was created. The white majority, first through the segre-
gation ordinances and then through a publicly sponsored conspiracy,
enforced racial segregation in the city. The shared incentives of the
white majority (isolation of crime, quarantining of disease, and mainte-
nance of property values at black-white boundaries) proved collectively
powerful enough to support a loose treaty which stifled sales to blacks.
This treaty was violated from time to time by outcast blockbusters will-
ing to buy from white sellers and to sell to black buyers, but ironically
these blockbusters became political partisans of the dual housing mar-
ket because it afforded them an opportunity for profit-taking.
Blockbusting vented the pressure and permitted the treaty to endure.
In rejecting the possibility of a conspiracy, Muth errs by assuming
that behavior in the aggregate is nothing more than a summation of
individual behaviors. Political economist Thomas C. Schelling pro-
vides a more sophisticated view in his book Micromotives and
Macrobehavior .2 10 Therein he opines that housing segregation is at
once individually motivated, collectively enforced, and economically
induced.21 ' Baltimore's history of residential segregation supports
Schelling's thesis.
Second, the Baltimore segregation ordinances remind us of forgot-
ten fears and false forecasts; they caution us of the perils of social plan-
ning. At the turn of the century the threat of contagion was a mortal
concern. With the acceptance of the germ theory came the recognition
209. Id. at 96. Muth also thinks it problematic that racial segregation results in blacks
paying markedly higher prices for housing of a given quality than do whites. But his ques-
tions are based on the assumption of a single housing market. Actually, Baltimore had a
dual housing market in which a growing black population was crowded into a more-or-less
fixed number of houses. If Muth were to accept the findings of this history, his model would
also predict higher housing prices for blacks. Id. at 100-02.
210. T. SCHELLING, MICROMOTIVES AND MACROBEHAVIOR 137-66 (1978).
211. Id. at 139.
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that the poor were carriers of tuberculosis, typhus, and other diseases
(all of which poor blacks had in disportionate numbers). The simplest
single explanation for segregation is that it represented an effort by the
healthy white majority to quarantine the unhealthy black minority.
When the segregation ordinances were conceived, racial Social
Darwinism was in vogue. This false teaching made the quarantine
seem an effective strategy. Blacks were viewed as a degenerating race
with a high mortality rate, low birth rate, and no future. Left to them-
selves, the Social Darwinists argued, Negroes would die out and with
them the threat of epidemic disease. Advances in public health, how-
ever, not racial quarantines, finally reduced the threat of contagion.
The black population, rather than disappearing, came to outnumber
whites in Baltimore City. The social engineers who propounded the
segregation ordinances were on the wrong track moving in the wrong
direction.
A third lesson we have gained from Baltimore's history of housing
segregation is that we must discount the righteous rhetoric of reform.
Since the early twentieth century the Progressive Reform Movement
has advocated government intervention into the residential housing
market. But, if we observe closely the motives of the self-appointed
promoters of the public interest, the reformers plainly were not inter-
ested in improving the living conditions of those who suffered most
from the industrializing, urbanizing society. Instead, the reformers
supported housing segregation as a means for preventing contagion
and civil disturbance as it affected the white community. Similarly,
these reformers earnestly proposed and implemented slum clearance
without providing substitute housing opportunities for those whose
homes were destroyed. In their efforts to impose a quarantine on dis-
ease and crime, and to protect the value of their property, reformers
conveniently overlooked the devastating effect slum clearance and ra-
cial segregation had on black housing opportunities. Instead, reform-
ers salved their guilt by "blaming the victims" for the slum conditions
in which they lived.
Finally, this history of residential segregation in Baltimore docu-
ments the racist propensity of democratic rule. In an opinion sus-
taining the constitutionality of a law that required a majority vote at a
local referendum as a prerequisite to the siting of a low-income hous-
ing project, U.S. Supreme Court Justice Hugo Black said: "Provisions
for referendums demonstrate devotion to democracy, not to bias, dis-
crimination, or prejudice." '2 12 Our history suggests that Black's dichot-
212. James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137, 141 (1971).
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omy is a false one. In Baltimore's housing market, democracy and
discrimination were inclusive, not exclusive. Democratic institutions
conceived, promoted, and implemented racial prejudice and bias. Jus-
tice Black's idealized notion of democracy presupposes that "govern-
ment of the people, by the people, and for the people" promotes the
welfare of all the people. More often under democratic rule, a majority
of the people form a coalition that takes political, economic, and so-
cial advantage of a minority of the people.
While Baltimore's democratic institutions were unrelenting in
their anti-black bias, the United States Supreme Court thrice inter-
vened to abrogate discrimination in the housing market. Buchanan v.
Warley,213 decided in 1917, held de jure segregation of residential
housing unconstitutional; Shelley v. Kraemer2" 4 decided in 1948, held
judicial enforcement of private racial restrictions unconstitutional; and,
Jones v. Mayer,2' decided in 1968, found all public and private racial
discrimination in housing unlawful on statutory grounds. In a grand
sense the Court was living up to its role as a protector of minorities
from majority oppression. Mr. Justice Jackson best described this
need: "The very purpose of a Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain
subjects from the vicissitudes of political controversy, to place them be-
yond the reach of majorities and officials and to establish them as legal
principles to be applied by the courts. '21 6 But in historic and legal con-
text each of these decisions was a surprise. Buchanan v. Warley was
soundly criticized in the law reviews of its day for the cavalier manner
in which the opinion ignored precedents that had upheld de jure segre-
gation in education and transportation. 17 Leading legal scholars have
questioned whether in Shelley v. Kraemer "the state may have properly
been charged with discrimination when it does no more than give effect
to an agreement that the individual involved is, by hypothesis, entirely
free to make."2 8 And in Jones v. Mayer the Court breathed a new
meaning into a statutory provision that had been construed for 100
years as applicable only to governmental action.2" 9 Taken together,
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these three cases support the hypothesis that racial restrictions on land
use are peculiarly vulnerable to judicial challenge.
A realpolitik explanation suggests itself. Land use and politics
make strange bedfellows. For example, in Construction Industry Associ-
ation v. City of Petaluma,22 ° a 1975 federal case, the NAACP found
itself sleeping with the builders and the brokers in opposing land use
controls that curtailed the growth rate of a California town. This me-
nage d trois favored growth as a means not only of expanding housing
opportunity, but also of turning a profit. The plaintiffs alleged that
limitations on growth violated both "personal" and "property" rights
under the fourteenth amendment.
In Baltimore's history of housing segregation, the line-up of par-
ties was not quite so anomalous. Most respectable bankers, builders,
and brokers acquiesced in the creation of a dual real estate market. But
others-property owners and brokers who found their holdings deval-
ued by the segregation laws-yelled loud and hard. Significantly, in
Buchanan v. Warley the court struck down the segregation ordinance
because it deprived landowners of their property without due process
of law, while in Shelley v. Kraemer the Court voided restrictive cove-
nants because they deprived blacks of equal protection of the law.
Hence, the ultimate rejection of housing segregation in Jones v. Mayer
afforded the Court an opportunity to strike a blow for the sanctity of
property and against racial discrimination, with a single stroke.
220. 522 F.2d 897 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 934 (1976).
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